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COMPARATIVE LAW AS A COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH:
A EUROPEAN TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR JACK A.
HILLER*
Bernhard Grossfeld**
I. Introduction
An aura of "malaise" hangs over the field of Comparative Law'sometimes alluded to as the "drama" of Comparative Law2 (private and
public).3 Indeed, the comparative scholar is often asked whether his
work has any practical importance. This is the question he fears most.
A German legal philosopher once criticized the whole approach as
follows: "Nobody asks what comparative law is and how it should be
pursued. Thus, it is less to build a new structure from the laws compared,
but to leave an accumulation of raw bricks in a heap that will never be
used."5 Still today it is unclear what method to follow, and whether a
method is necessary at all.6 Thus, Comparative Law remains to be
plagued by the lack of deeper discussions on the notions of "law" and
"comparison".7 To speak of it in terms of practical values might "verge
A tribute to Professor Hiller, the pioneer in the field of law, language and writing.
Professor Jack Hiller teaches law at Valparaiso University School of Law. Professor
Hiller received his J.D. from Valparaiso University School of Law in 1955 and his LL.M.
from Yale Law School in 1963.
.. Professor of Law, University of Muenster; Director, Institute of Comparative
Law. Dr.
Juris. 1960, University of Muenster; LL.M. 1963, Yale University.
I would like to thank Hank A. Cepeda, who received his B.F.A. from Parsons
School of Design and M.F.A. from Brooklyn College. Mr. Cepeda helped me with the
technical details, but even more by contributing his ideas during many conversations at
New York University Law School.
1 See generally Bogumila Puchalska-Tych & Michael Salter, Comparing Legal Cultures
of Eastern Europe: The Need for a Dialectical Analysis, 16 LEGAL STUD. 157 (1996).
2 See generally Frances Olsen, The Drama of Comparative Law, 2 UTAH L. R. 267

(1997).

3 See Edward J. Eberle, Comparative Public Law: A Time That Has Arrived, in
FESTSCHRIFr GROSSFELD 175 (1999). See generally James D. Bryce & Bernhard

Grossfeld, A Brief Comparative History of the Origins of the Income Tax in Great
Britain, Germany and the United States, 2 AM. J. TAx PoLIcY 211 (1983).

4 See generally BERNHARD GROSSFELD, STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS oF COMPARATvE LAW
(Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 1990) (1990); BASIL S. MARKESINIS, FOREIGN LAW
AND METHODOLOGY: A SUBJECT AND A THEsIs (1997).
5 JuLus BINDER, PmLOSOPHIE DES REcHTs 948 (1925).
6 See

Geoffrey Samuel, Comparative Law and Jurisprudence, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.J.
817, 826 (1998).
7 See Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUDIES 232, 238 (1996).
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on the ridiculous."
But the questions start already on a more basic level: What does
"practice" mean in law as opposed to "theory"? Can practice and theory
be separated? After all, concepts of order "live" in the human minds how then do you distinguish practice and theory? But probably the
question has a narrower focus: how important is Comparative Law for
legislators, for courts, for attorneys, and for students? I will try to answer
the question from a European point of view, 9 from a Europe of which
Germany forms a "region.1O
This sequence from Europe to Germany seems to be proper
today because of the new elan that the European Union brought onto the
old Continent. I give the keywords: Rediscovery of common European
traditions, meeting of talents in the European institutions, growing
European legislation, freedom of establishment for lawyers, tax
counselors, and accountants. These ideas blow across Europe like spring
storms, changing the European views of the world. Europe has to
redefine its legal culture, has to cope with global forces that may shatter
old assumptions. To meet this challenge Comparative Law might offer
itself as an instrument to better understand the past and to find the
future." But is this hope justified?
HI. Europe
1. Legislation, Courts
There is no doubt that Comparative Law is very, very practical
here. It "analyzes the other"'12 by bringing in foreign ideas of how things
can be done, and lets us share foreign experiences. It shows us the
background from which our European partners operate, and into which
we speak when addressing them. We become aware of what we had
almost forgotten in our national enclaves. We only understand each
other when we first have a general feeling for our partners' geographical
8 See Rudolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39

Am. J. Comp. L. 1,2 (1998).
9 The American view may be different. See generallyMathias Reimann, Stepping Out of
the European Shadow: Why Comparative Law in the United States Must Develop Its

Own Agenda, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 637 (1998).
10See generally Bernhard Grossfeld, Basic Problems of Comparative Law, 39 TYDsKnF
ViR Dm SUIDAFRICKAANSE REG/J. OF SouTH AFRIcAN L. 192 (1987).
11See generally Abbo Junker, ComparativeLaw as a Core Subject, . OF SOUTH AFRIcAN

L. 682 (1994).

Vivian Grosswald Curran, Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law's Potentialfor
BroadeningLegal Perspectives,46 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 657 (1998).
12
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and cultural environment, when we share basic experiences.
This is particularly necessary, when European partners
cooperate in order to set up common rules, e.g., European statutes, be it
regulations or directives (e.g., arts. 189, 235 of the Treaty establishing
the European Community ("EC Treaty")1 3), or judicial decisions. It is a
matter of high concern in the European Council, in the European
Commission, and above all, in the European Court of Justice. The Court
could only achieve and preserve its high reputation because it was able
to evoke common European concepts, common cultural denominators
and deep European pictures mostly found through comparative work.
The intensity of the work does not even appear in printed materials; it is
largely achieved through informal discussions among the justices
showing us again, that orality is an indispensable factor in Comparative
Law, where alphabet - addicts soon come to their limits. This power of
orality is far too often overlooked because it is not "visible," and
because of the myth in modem Western laws that "quod non est in actis,
non est in mundo" (translated to mean, "what is not written, does not
exist").
There is strong pressure on the Court to proceed in this
culturally sensitive way according to the best jurisprudential traditions.' 4
The Court depends, to a large extent, on the willingness of the national
courts to cooperate, as most of the cases are referred to the Court by the
national courts. 15 That is why the Court watches closely the statistic of
references. If the Court loses in status, the national courts will find ways
to dodge the Court notwithstanding any obligation to refer. The letter of
the law ends where authority from outside the written words ends. This
cooperative model explains the success of the European Court of Justice
and the willingness of national courts to accept the rulings. Comparative
law thus is the basis of the Court's European trustworthiness.
2. European Interpretation
Another serious matter for Comparative Law is the concept of
European interpretation. The cornerstone is art. 5 of the EC Treaty,
which imposes a duty of good faith and fairness on all Member States
towards the European Union. 16 Consequently, all national law has to be
13See Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992),

[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
14 See generally William Ewald, The JurisprudentialApproach to Comparative Law: A
Field Guide to "Rats",46 AM. L CoMe. L. 701 (1998).
5
See EC TREATY art. 177.
16 See EC TREATY art. 5.
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interpreted in view of the European norms that might wear on it:
European-minded interpretation is the rule of the day. This again brings
in Comparative Law as an instrument to avoid divergences in the law of
the Member States. It is indispensable to watch the developments in
other Member States to arrive, at least, at homogenous solutions.
Ill. Member States
1. Insolvency
But even within the Member States' laws, Comparative Law
plays a prominent role. A prime example is the new German Statute on
Insolvency that came into force on January 1, 1999.17 The statute follows
American and English patterns concerning reorganizations, and relieves
the "honest" debtor from his liabilities after seven years (discharge).
This is a drastic change from the old traditions under which bankruptcy
normally "killed" the debtor by exposing him to future persecutions for
all his life (normally for thirty years).' 8 Now, the "honest" debtor might
expect a future without debt if he tries to do his best over seven years. 19
The starting point for this revolutionary approach can be pinpointed: it
began with a Comparative Law dissertation at the university of
Goettingen in 1977.20

2. Conflict of Laws
Conflict of laws is another mighty engine for the promotion of
Comparative Law. Cross-border activities are multiplying within the
European Union, and the Euro gives a new push to it. Contracts,
marriages, successions and assets move from one legal realm into the
other, and we are then challenged to apply the living, foreign law for
quite normal transactions. Only Comparative Law approaches can train
us for the "art" to see the foreign as distant and different from us, but as
familiar to the foreigner's point of view. Even then, we may run into
sometimes- insurmountable hurdles, but we are at least better prepared to
17 See 1994 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] 12866 [hereinafter InsO]. Germany voted in favor

of the new Insolvency Act, the Insolvenzordnung, in 1994. See Klaus Kamlah, The New
GermanInsolvency Act: Insolvenzordnang,70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 417,417-18 (1996).
18 See 1935 RGB1 321, 356, as amended [hereinafter VerglO].
19 See David A. Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1325, 1385-86 (1998).
20 See generally ULRICH KRAMER, DAS ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHE SONDERVERFAHREN ZUR
REORGANISATION VON KAPITALGESELLsCHAFrEN NACH ABSEHMr X DES BANCRUPTCY

ACT

1977 (1977).
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watch out for such hurdles - and better is better than not better.
Comparative Law teaches us to reach beyond the poverty of writing,
beyond the "exclusive" authority of paper, and to look for the pictures,
models and allusions that give meaning to the letter of the law though
this often scratches the limits of our abilities.
3. International Standards
But the needs for and the virtues of Comparative Law go far
beyond that. Right now we are experiencing a revolution from the rules
of accounting, i.e., the International Accounting Standards (IAS). In
Germany, the new section 292a of the Commercial Code (the
Handelsgesetzbuch, or "HGB") allows German holding companies
largely to skip the German (European) rules for group accounts if their
shares are traded on a foreign stock exchange. 21 Now, they are allowed
to set up their balance sheets and their earnings - and loss accounts under International Standards, be it the International Accounting
Standards, as mentioned above, or the U.S. American Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 22 There are only some
reservations with regard to the European principle of true and fair view
(principle of truth). Thus, rules of accounting are opening up a new
continent for Comparative Law: To handle the standards properly it is
indispensable to know the cultural and technical background from where
these standards come.23
Consequently, there has to be a constant dialog with other
cultures and with the experts there; also, the ongoing developments
abroad are closely to be watched. This does not end with law, however:
Different economic situations might recommend a different solution
under the true and fair view - concept. Comparative law comes back to
its basic beginnings: First to talk with the other culture of how she sees
the world - and then find out whether we can compare it or not.
4. Contracts in a Foreign Language24
Another impetus for Comparative Law stems from the fact that
contracts are frequently written in English or American and,
21 See

22

HANDELSGESETZBUCH (Commercial Code) § 292a (also referred to as HGB).
See id.

2

See id.

See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 57 (1998); Joseph Vining, The Gift of Language, 73 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1581
(1998).
24
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consequently, English or American law is often applicable. But even if
German law prevails: What do the foreign terms mean in a German legal
text? Or German terms in a foreign language sentence? To what extent
can foreign notions, German sentence structures and unspoken
underpinnings be reconciled with the foreign words, and how?
Hermeneutics turn into lottery far beyond Heidegger's wildest
expectations. The matter gets even worth with a quite different writing,
be it Hebrew or Chinese. What hermeneutics - which always refer to a
special writing - should be applied? Can German legal terms be brought
into a reasonable relation with other semiotic systems? The
comparativist shudders as he knows that there is no easy answer and
probably even no answer at all - but without Comparative Law, we
would not even realize that there is a problem, and then try to avoid or to
minimize it. We see: Using foreign terms and trying to translate them
cannot be done without Comparative Law. Equal or similar names are
too often "faux amis. ':
IV. A New Twist
Today we are using Comparative Law mainly as a tool of our
curiosity, as an expression of our drive to learn about the world - not just
about letters. But that is no longer sufficient. In a globalized world, it is
important that others understand us. We have to expose ourselves to our
partners in order to be accepted as trustworthy and nonexotic.
Comparative Law thus becomes a bridge in two directions: from "them"
to us, and from us to "them."
This is what International Accounting is all about. We have to
ensure that our national corporations look as beautiful from the figures
in their balance sheets as do their competitors from other countries - and
that the German "Michel" looks as attractive as the French "Marianne"
(remember Gottfried Keller's short story "Clothes Make People"). Only
then can our national corporations have a chance to attract capital on
international markets for comparably low prices. This is of
overwhelming importance for their survival, since in the long run they
cannot effectively compete against someone with lower costs for equity
or debt (interests and compound interests are the strongest social forces
we know of).
Even beyond that technical - though vital - point of view, it is of

the utmost importance to clarify how the inner eyes of a foreign culture
25 See

John H. Baker, The Three Languages of the Common Law, 43 McGILu L. J. 5, 8-9

(1998).
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look on us. We cannot learn this from written texts alone, as they might
be colored by omissions (writing misses both overtones and undertones),
tactics, flattery, prejudices, or even taboos. Only a face to face encounter
with the foreign culture and a patient conversation on the basis of mutual
respect can help us, since one does not learn about foreign law by
studying its legal vocabulary. 6
V. European Identity
Within Europe, we are still rather naive in our comparative law
approaches, taking the letters of the foreign law largely as "the" law.
This attitude flows from the feeling that there is a common
understanding of ordering through law and from the idea that we share a
common background of a "silent" cultural environment (which is largely
true). We rely on a common European tradition that we take for granted.
The rise of the European Union encouraged this belief in a common
heritage. Indeed, we are astonished to see how structures in different
Member States are much more intertwined with each other than we had
ever realized in that we even share a similar history, e.g., Roman law,
history of accounting. 27 We are learning a new a European identity in
law that includes England.
By the same token, we realize why the exchange of legal views
and of legal experiences withered away in modem times. A strong factor
is the loss of orality, the loss of pictures, and most importantly, the
invention of the printing press (around 1450 in Mainz, Germany). 2' The
growing flood of letters washed away pictures, and it became an
avalanche of gigantic proportions through Luther's Reformation (1517)
with its "sola scriptura."29
This impact of writing on communication is particularly strong
in connection with our alphabet. The Latin alphabet follows the spoken
language (though differently in degrees, as seen in the German and
English languages) and it cannot be understood without knowing the
language. Thus, the petrifying effects of writing fixes and enlarges the
language differences: Pidgin European will not grow in an
alphabetized environment, since the stabilizing power of writing
26

See Samuel, supra note 6, at 826 (quoting D.R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEAsURE:

SOCIAL THouGHT IN u W sTEPN LEGAL T ADmoN 49 (1990)).
27See Bernhard Grossfeld, ComparativeAccounting, 28 TEx. INT'L L.J. 233
2
s See HAROLD INNs, Thu BIAS OF COMMUNICATIOMN (1951).

(1993).

Sola scriptura literally means one script or the script by itself. In the context of the
Lutheran Church, it refers to the study of Christianity by analyzing the scriptures
themselves, and not referring to old traditions and scriptures, as does the Catholic
Church. This is a fundamental teaching of Martin Luther.
29
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impedes an "osmotic" mutual penetration. A law that pretends to exist
exclusively in letters tends to be void of sensual over- and undertones
(logic has no "senses") and thus restricts meetings of the minds as much
as enabling them. °
VI. United States of America

31

1. England / America
But does the practical importance of Comparative Law reach
beyond Europe - to the United States of America? I am choosing the
United States as an example because some authors tend to localize
Americans as quite close to Europe. However, this is a mistake. The
32
error is induced by the term "Anglo-American law," which I never use.
In my view, English law is part of European law whereas American law
has a status of itself Certainly, there are connecting features like history,
writing, and religion. But there are also strong differences in geography,
size, climate and language - and they prevail over time as they form the
strong local "currents"(order is first "local"). Another important
difference between England and the United States is the length of time
over which traditions (rituals) and feelings for order develop.
The misconceptions about the closeness of the Unites States to
England partly explain why Europeans first run into so many problems.
In addition, we first received an idealized "Readers Digest" marketing
picture. Everything looked beautiful, well settled, harmonious, and just
rich. The picture displayed more individual homes, more private cars,
great schools, more and more and more. But this picture broke down on
a second glance; America presented more of its real colors, but also
awoke more sympathy and empathy.
2. Puzzles
There are a lot of puzzles left. The American jury is difficult to
qualify: Does it find the law or does it apply the law? Is it the American
law? Are the rhetoric, the body language, and the choice of jurors more
important than the written texts we are referred to? What about the
30

See Bernhard Grossfeld, Language, Writing and Law, 5 EuR. REV. 383 (1997).

Cf William Twining, Civilians Don't Try: A Comment on Mirjan Damalka's
"Rationaland IrrationalProofRevisited," 5 CARDozo J. INT'L & COMP. L. 69, 70-72

31

(1997).
32

Cf Paul D. Carrington, Moths to Light: The Dubious Attraction of American Law, in

FESTSCHRFr GROSSFELD 143 (1999).
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"central staff' of the Appeal Courts? How are these staff judges
appointed? Are the relation, the closeness, or the distance of the written
texts to jurors and judges similar to the ones we are accustomed to? Is
"hermeneutic " the same when the "distance" to the text is different?
How real is "stare decisis" given the wide choices available and the
American imagination with words? Is American law less restrained by
traditions? Is "stare decisis the same in England as in the United States?
We are perplexed by "Clinton and Monica," confessions on the Internet,
and an aborted impeachment. Is the U.S. Senate a "court" when being
prosecutor and judge at the same time? We are at odds to catch the
dynamics that occasionally come to surface in a society that is so
different from ours in size, structure, history and power.
VII. Asia / Japan

1. Exoticism
This feeling of foreignness, of otherness, is particularly strong
when we go into Asia and, in particular, into Japan. For Europeans "
Miss Saigon" often means "Asia," and Japan has been for a long time
the exotic country par excellence. "Madame Butterfly" stands for this
proposition. We meet an island culture isolated from contacts with
foreigners for almost 300 years. We experience a population density
beyond any European experience; we see a semiotic system that makes
Europeans alphabet addicts. Together this creates a picture that is very
hard to understand from the outside world: three writing styles and a
tradition of group consciousness different from the European concept of
the autonomous individual. Certainly, we know that the Japanese
imported larger parts of the German civil law, but did this law based on
the concept of equality find its roots into the Japanese soul and from
there into the Japanese life? Does it motivate our Japanese partner from
the inside of his heart or is it a kind of plastic material not smoothly
fitting into a hierarchically structured world and not being felt as part of
the natural environment? Grave doubts exist, as the concepts of Western
law do not work,33 at least as we see it. Are the Western names used to
paint a Western law impression or do they express the reality of social
relations?
2. Social Structure
33See Janet E. Ainsworth, A Tribute to Professor William C. Stones. On Seeing Chinese

Law from the Chinese Point of View: An Appreciative Look at the Scholarly Career of
Professor William Jones, 74 WAsH. U. L.Q. 547, 548-49 (1996).
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We hardly understand the Japanese social structure, as we are
not accustomed to such closely interwoven networks with a lack of
transparency because of the closeness, of the population density. We
know practically nothing about informal social controls in a country in
which our "at arm's length" approach cannot be the standard due to the
lack of space. We know nothing about the effects of rituals, nor the
impact of traditional roles, be they private or public. What about family
registers scrupulously kept for hundreds of years? What experiences and
pictures, which we do not share, prevail?
We are baffled by the fact that some young people from certain
families, which we cannot identify as peculiar, do not have a chance to
enter bourgeois professions or any decent professions at all. The choice
left to them is to become "yazuka," to become members of a Mafia-like
group that does not only "underground" but also "overground" work,
sometimes with a Robin Hood type reputation. Members of Yazuka are
active in gambling, prostitution, and extortion, but they also execute
debts for creditors by blackmailing the tardy debtor or by molesting him
with loudspeakers right in front of his house so that the neighbors hear
what an irresponsible guy he is. As "sokay," they extort money from
corporations in exchange for promising not to disturb the shareholder
meetings, thus enabling management to get along with the proceedings
as fast as possible (shareholder democracy?). Corporations are not
allowed to succumb to those pressures, but such is life.
3. Chances
This does not mean, however, that Comparative Law has no
place with regard to Japan.34 From my own experience, law in Japan is
contract law,35 corporation law, rules of accounting, 36 administrative
law,37 the handling might be difficult for us to understand because of the
lack of transparency. This is not the fault of the Japanese. The problem
34See generally Frank K. Upham, The Place of Japanese Legal Studies in American
ComparativeLaw, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 639 (1997).
35See generally Veronica Taylor, Continuing Transactions and Persistent Myths:
Contracts in ContemporaryJapan, 19 MELB. U. L. REv. 352 (1993).

See Masaso Kishida, Japanese Legal Accounting System, in FESTSCMIUFT GROSSFELD
569 (1999). See also Joseph J. Norton, Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in the
36

People's Republic of China, in FESTSCHRIPT GROSSFELD 809 (1999); Jeswald W.

Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A New Era of Law and
Development, in FESTSCHRIFT GROSSFELD 959 (1999).
37 See Frank K. Upham, Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in
Comparativeand InternationalPerspective, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396, 398 (1996).
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is ours when we take a fundamentally Western environment for granted,
however we define it (European or American?). It is also foolish to
discuss informal or non-legal aspects of order only with respect to Japan
and to overlook similar features in our own culture. Japan "is" tradition,
but so "are" we. The same is true elsewhere. We find differences in
degree but not to an extent that puts research into Japanese law outside
the realm of Comparative Law - if it is more than just textism?3 Not to
see this is exactly the "malaise" with the present state of discussion, with
the "comparative political correctness" which some regard as being
"scientific."
VIII. Language39

1. Social Position
Due to the closeness of language to law4" (sometimes
overstated), we regard different languages as the strongest impediment
for Comparative Law. Language certainly is a problem and it might be
even greater then most of us expect it to be. When we meet non-Western
cultures we often even do not know the position, which the spoken
language might have there. Do people feel bound by the spoken word?
Does it depend on circumstances we are not aware of?. Do only matter
facts and actions (rituals)? Is not the word in the beginning but the doing
(Goethe), the ritual of repeated performances? Poets sometimes share
this feeling with Goethe even for our own culture, as did the German
poet Guenther Eich, when he wrote his "Inventory"(as prisoner of war in
a prison camp):
38 See Frank K. Upham, The Place of JapaneseLegal Studies in American Comparative

Law, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 639, 649-51 (1997).
39 See Jack A. Hiller, Law, Language, Creativity and the Divided Mind Are We
ProducingHalf-Brained Lawyers?, in FESTSCHRIFT GROSSFELD 365 (1999) [hereinafter
Hiller,Half-BrainedLawyers].See also Stig Joergensen, Sprog og Virkelighed, Tidskrift
for Rettsvaesen 769 (1995); Hanne Petersen, On Law and Music Song Duels to Rhythmic
Legal Orders?, 41 J. LEGAL PLURALuSM & UNOFFICIAL L. 75 (1998). See generally Jack
A. Hiller, Language, Law, Sports, and Culture: The Transferability or NonTransferabilityof Words, Lifestyles, andAttitudes Through Law, 12 VAL. U. L. REv. 433
(1978) (this article has been reprinted in expanded form in M.L. MARASINGHE & W.E.
CONKLIN, LAW, LANGUAGE AND DEVELOPMENT 151 (1985)).
40 See Lawrence Joseph, Theories of Poetry, Theories of Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1227,
1228 (1993); John T. Cross, Language and the Law: The Special Role of Trademarks,
Trade Names, and Other Trade Emblems, 76 NEB. L. REV. 95, 98 (1997); Peter Sack,
Law, Language, Culture: Verbal Acrobatics and Unofficial Law, 41 J. LEGAL PLURALISM
& UNOFFiciAL L. 15, 17 (1998).
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"This is my cap,
this is my coat,
this is my shaving stuff
in the cotton sack

In my bread bag
You'll find a pair
of woolen socks and a few
things I won't tell anyone."
(Hilde Donin) 41
2. Reality?
We are trained to believe in language and to accept it as reality:
A word credo takes the position of facts:
"Word and thing
lay closely pressed
against each other
the same body warmth
in thing and word."
(Hilde Domin)4 2
But this belief in language depends on our familiarity with the
environment in which our language operates and that we share with the
speaker. The sense for taking words a reality also stems from our
longing for security, for our looking for the safety in the word (Cf.
Luther's "the word they should leave standing"). But there is a
qualification to be made: real life is more skeptical, as shown by the
often heart remark "Sounds good" (judgment reserved!).
3. Differences
Differences exist in particular with regard to China, where the

4' GuNTER EICH ET AL., FouR GERMAN POETS 73 (Agnes Stein ed. and trans., Red Dust

1979) (poem by Hilde Domin).

42 id.
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real "language" is the Chinese writing4 3 and ritual, but also with regard
to Japan where linguistic rituals and linguistic elegance may be more
important than exact meanings. Missing the proper rituals leads to the
exclusion from the group. Therefore, many over- and undertones44
produce vagueness to a much greater extent than we are accustomed.
One has to listen to the music and rhythm of language, to the body
language accompanying it, to get a feeling for the meaning. Likewise,
the "language of silence" might be different and more important.4 5
4. Precision?
It also our cultural view that there should be no chaos (God
created the world "orderly"):
"I want you
A square bowl he (Confucius) says
must
have comers
he says
or the state will perish
nothing else, he says is necessary
call round, round
and square, square."
(Hilde Domin)4
We even believe that language is the prime tool for ordering.
This is shown by the German word: "bestimmt" (meaning precise); it
says: "defined by voice" (lit. "bevoiced"). But that belief always remains
a dream, an illusion47- nurtured by the mathematical - algebraic structure
of the alphabet. There can never be precision in such a complex set.
43 Cf Claudia Ross & Lester Ross, Language and Law: Sources of Systemic Vagueness
and Ambiguous Authority in Chinese Statutory Language, 31 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv.
205 (1997).
44 See generally BRAN Bix, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMiNAcY (1993).

45 See Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1995); KINGKOK CHEUNG, ARTICULATE SILENcEs 18 (1993); TLLIE OLSEN, SmENCES 239 (1978).

46 See EicI et al., supra note 41, at 78-79.
47 See generally James Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical
Issues, 82 CAL. L. REV. 509, 522 (1994); ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL

THEORY 13 (1992); Arthur Ripstein, Law, Language andInterpretation,46 U. TORONTO
L.J. 335 (1996).
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Language is and remains "Delphi" and the search for more and more
precision soon reaches its economic limits48 - though there are
differences in degree among various cultures. In the long run the "dance
of contingency, of the indeterminable, outwits us all."' 9
The pseudo- precision in Western legal terms, as an expression
of wishful, religiously inspired thinking, has closed our eyes to the fact
that law is more than analysis and static regulation; it is more than
finding reasons for suing one another. Through law communities try to
understand themselves. Law is the ongoing dynamic conversation of a
culture with herself, is the sharing of experiences and hopes, is the
exchange of know-how with all means of expressions and rituals, with
the body and with the mind. The European wordcentrism and textism has
blinded our eyes for too long. We are language- and alphabet- addicts
being trained to see language as our servant. We thus belittle language's
power over us, its many colors- which we never frilly comprehend- and
blind ourselves for the environment that makes meaning out of sounds.
X. Silence
Words get their meaning from the silent environment, they are
drifting on an ocean of silence; they form "das Gelaeut der Stille"(
"words are the carol bells of silence") as Heidegger used to say. We will
never frilly find out how silence drifts into the words, acts as a kind of
software that we cannot reproduce - but we can be sure that silence gives
color to the words and receives color from them. We are much less
prepared to meet these challenges than we pretend to do.
Silence can be read in many different ways. It can mean active
or passive approval, but also active or passive resistance. What is said
and what is not said shapes each event - but there exist gradual
differences between talk and silence among cultures: "Silence and its
counterpart storytelling derive their specific meanings from specific
contexts., 50 "Beredtes Schweigen" (talking silence) - as we say in
Germany - is not just a natural silence in the cycle of life, but an active
silence. It is not a simple or even inferior rhetorical symbol; it must be
read polysemously and multivalently. 51 It may be "heart" as a listening to
cultural discrepancies or as the waiting for an appropriate time to
48 See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic

Perspective on Precisionin the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 541, 553-554 (1994).
49 LOREN EISELEY, THE STAR THROWER 169, 175 (1979).
" Margaret (H.R.) Chon, On the Need for Asian American Narratives in Law: Ethnic
Specimens, Native Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L. J.
4, 23 (1995).
51 See id at 25.
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intervene; it can mean approval, contradiction or opposition.5 2 Thus, a
"narrative of silence" deserves our focus in its own right It may be an
instrument of seizing or of relinquishing control and in this respect is as
incommensurable as the voice. Silence, as control, might sometimes
even be more powerful. However, learning from the grammar and from
the voice of silence may be more difficult than to learn from sounds. 4
This is particularly true with Asia: The interpretation of silence there
stems from contexts that may give other meanings to silence and the
voice than we are accustomed to.
X. Translation
1. Words Cannot Be Translated
We build our life through language and we see, through the
focus of the inner eye, that language construes in us even before we were
born (cf. "mother-language"). Without being refocused we tend to
believe that the world created by our language is the real world. But how
can we translate "views of the world"? 5 We have learned, that words
(alone) cannot be translated 6 in order to translate even a single word
without distortion "one would have to transport the entire language
around it."'s7 But that is not even enough: To translate a text without
changes in meaning "one would have to transfer its audience as well. 5 8
Only meaningless words can be displaced from one jurisdiction to
another 9 - but how to find out whether a word is meaningless? That is
already part of the question.
2. Common Experiences
What can be translated at all if we lack common experiences?
Every language is a conglomerate of feelings, experiences and traditions
that we cannot filly disentangle. We cannot even describe exactly the
meaning of one language in another language. There is no culturally
52

See id.

5 See id.
54 See IVAN ILuCK, CLEBRATION OF AWARENESS 32 (1970).

" Peter W. Schroth, Legal Translation,34 AM. J. COMI. L. 47 (1986).
56 Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Differences and Categories in US.
ComparativeLaw, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 43 (1998).
57 See EVA HOFFMAN, LOST IN TRANSLATION 175 (1989).
58 Id at 275.
59 See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants,4 MAASTRsHTS J. EURO.
& CoM.L. I 11, 120 (1997).
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neutral language 60 and no seiotic system can be fully caught by
another: The connotations are inevitably different and unpredictable (try
to express music in words or poetry in music!). Language is the poetic
song of culture and every culture sings a different song with a different
rhythm referring to a different background and to different imprints from
earliest childhood.
3. China
a. Indeterminacy
The problems of translation are of greatest concern with regard
to China. Translations into language clash with each different idea, not
only about the status of orality but even more about precision in the
language.61 Whereas we take for granted that statutory language should
be clear, comprehensive and unambiguous this is not the expectation in
China. Certainly, some indeterminacy is unavoidable everywhere
(language is always "Delphi ") - but there are important differences in
degree. Intrinsic vagueness characterizes Chinese statutes; the cause is
the language itself, its lexicon and its grammar. 62 Therefore, this feature
of Chinese law is deeply culturally embedded and is not easily avoided. 63
Certain syntactic structures and words with similar but not identical
meanings create vague obligations (shall/must or may/should). They are
very difficult to capture by translation.
b. Moral Principles
The problem is aggravated by the fact that not just language
makes for vagueness. Language operates within a network of powerful
moral principles (Confucianism) that encircles "law " more than we are
accustomed to. The Confucian heritage assumes the form of ethical
imperatives with an aura of being immutable and self- evident. Even
though Confucianism is often not consciously and wholesomely abided
today, many of its ethical tenets have become part of everyday life. They
introduce the principles of benevolence and loyalty into every social
60 See

David J. Gerber, System Dynamics: Toward a Language of ComparativeLaw? 46

Am. J. COMp. L. 719, 720 (1998).
61 See Anne S.Y. Cheung, Towards a Bilingual Legal System - - The Developments of
Chinese Legal Language, 19 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 315, 323-24 (1997).
62 See Claudia Ross & Lester Ross, Language and Law: Sources of Systematic
Vagueness and Ambiguous Authority in Chinese Statutory Language, 31 U. BRT.
COLJM.
L. REv. 205, 207-10 (1997).
63
See id. at 252.
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interaction to balance potentially inflexible encounters. 64 It is, therefore,
highly cherished to leave latitude for negotiation. 65 That is why Chinese
show a stylistic preference for vagueness and ambiguity even if the
language would allow for a clear meaning.
The underlying assumption is, that normally conciliation and
mediation precede litigation, and that the chances to obtain fulfillment of
the obligation depends on the consensus of the parties that performance
serves their mutual interest. Thus, we know very little to nothing about
how obligations are enforced. There is almost no published information
concerning Chinese court proceedings and very few actual cases of
enforcement.66 Strong taboos and vague "explanations" surround the
whole matter.67 It is also important that the question of right or wrong
cannot be answered in an abstract way. "Justice" is relational and varies
with the relative status of the parties; contracts do not put parties on
level grounds (like in Europe), as ritual behavior does not apply equally
to all parties.6 8 "Policy itself is law. 69
c. Wide Hallows
Generally, notions have loose meanings and wide hallow (or
shades?): Any action that shares even remote characteristics with
enumerated actions will be considered to fall into the same class. Take
for instance references to modifications or rescissions caused by force
major or "some other cause", the other cause not being defined. 70 71A
sentence like "nulla poena sine lege" does not enter the Chinese mind.
XI. Writing
1. Key Cultural Technique
This impediment to Comparative Law is even stronger when we
consider different writings as cultural memories. The hurdles thus
6

See generally Hoiman Chan & Rance P.L Lee, Hong Kong Families; At the

Crossroadsof Modernism and Traditionalism,26 . CoMP. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1995).
65 See Ross, supra note 62, at 229-30.
66 See Todd R. Benson, Taking Security in China: Approaching U.S. Practices, 21 YALE
. INT'LL. 183, 194-95 (1996).
67 See generally Liang Zhiping, Explication "Law": A Comparative Perspective of
Chinese and Western Legal Cultures, 3 . CHINESE L. 55, 55-63 (1989).
68See Ross, supra note 62, at 231.
69
Benson, supra note 66, at 190.
70 See Ross, supra note 62, at 249-50.
71

See id., at 248.
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erected are hard to overcome, and they are more disturbing because we
often do not realize that they exist. We normally believe that we
translate languages; whereas, in reality, we translate writing, for
example, from the Hebrew or the Chinese writing into our alphabet or
vice versa. Writing is the key technique in modem cultures; it regulates
and identifies societies (e.g. the "Holy Scripture"). It is more than a tool;
it is our master; it is the perfect example of the subliminal influence of
signs on our concepts of order.72 Signs "make" order!
We know that semiotic systems of whatever nature, particularly
writing, bind groups together as strongly as they separate them from
other groups. Exclusive signs - exclusive codes - are at the core of any
successful minority in business. For example, consider the strength of
Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia.
2. Power
Cultural discipline, modes of thought, and views of the world
receive their form and logic from writing. According to the Jewish
Talmud, God played with the 22 letters of the Hebrew alphabet before
the creation of the world, and the letters offered themselves to him so
that he might use them to build the world. Under this concept the letters
form the grammar of the cosmos guarantying its existence, and God is
the author of the world. When only a single letter is missing the world
will collapse, as the world is "sola scriptura." The overwhelming
importance of writing has long been overlooked. We all know that the
Latin alphabet formed the European culture. Indeed, writing has a key
role in binding cultures together and in separating them from others. Its
tends to indicate completeness; whereas, in reality, the gaps between the
letters are always wider than the space occupied by letters themselves.
By the same token, different writings suggest a different view of
the world and train different intellectual abilities. Alphabetic letters and
ideograms (or pictograms) induce other techniques and lead to other
hermeneutics and to other "conversations" with the text. Our
hermeneutics are scripture-bound: different writings evoke different
songs of life! Writing is never passive, but it is subliminally wry and
very active. Therefore, Comparative Law is to a great extent comparative
semiotics.
The power of writing, however, has made us to forget that the
word "creates" and that the letter may "kill." Voice has more life and
color in it than the writing, body language and gestural language that

72

See generally Grossfeld, supra note 30.
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often accompany voice,73 and we have to keep this "more" alive.74
According to Greek mythology, Orpheus went into the empire of death
with nothing but his voice, and with it, he stood up against death.
3. Mental Model
a. Voice vs. Letter
Not having really understood the power of writing and its
relation to the voice, we are even misguided with regard to our own law.
We are too often tempted to believe that the letter is the law and that law
is a process of logical deduction from letters. We are alphabet addicts. 75
The reality, however, is different even in our own laws though the
degrees of distance between letter and law might vary even within
Europe. Certainly, letters are very powerful signs, but their power has
limits. The reason is simple: the law exists in the mind and is always
different from its form in the book 76 Law is a shared mental model of
communities, and written rules are only a greater or smaller part of this
model. 77 In reality, the law of a country consists of an immense mass of
ideas concerning human behavior accumulated during centuries through
the contribution of innumerable cooperators. 78 The letters are just signs
on paper intended to call up certain pictures in the reader's mind, and the
pictures receiving their color from elsewhere count.
b. Simplicity
The mental model "law" reaches beyond language; it operates
with pictures not expressed in words (the silent environment).79 Though
more broadly based, the model tends to be simpler than the written law
due to the cognitive limits of the human mind. Rules of thumb abound,
leaving logic behind and making complexity understandable.80 The rule
73 See Michael C. Corballis, The Gestural Origins of Language, 87 Am. ScImrisT 138,

145 (1999).

74
7 See generally Grossfeld,

supranote 30.
1 See Lynn M. LoPuckd, Legal Culture,Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers'Heads,
90Nw. U. L. REv. 1498, 1498 (1996).
76 See, e.g., Timothy Egan, The Persistence of Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES MAO., Feb. 28,
1999, at 51, 53.
77
See, e.g., LoPucki, supranote 75, at 1501-04.
78 See generally KARL OuvEcRoNA, LAW AS FACT 25-47 (Stevens & Sons, 2d ed. 1971).
79 See ROUNDTABLE ON LAW AND SEMIONICS, LAW AND THE CoNFLIcr OF IDEOLOGIES:

NINTH ROUNDTABLE ON LAW AND SEMIONiCS 67-69, 73-74 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1996).
so See LoPuckd, supra note 75, at 1542.
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of the written law in our culture is thus largely a myth used to give an
orderly impression to outsiders and to lend authority to decisions that
often depend on unwritten considerations (controversial cases are not
decided by logic but "from the gut"). The mental model might be
resistant to changes in the written law. A famous example is the 1978
U.S. Bankruptcy Code that provided for the discharge of all debts except
those specifically excepted; no exception was made for debts secured by
mortgages. 8 1 Nevertheless, in practice everybody knows that a debtor
can not free his home of a mortgage by filing bankruptcy, and everybody
acts accordingly.82
LoPucki tells us that experienced lawyers work relatively little
with the written law. 83 Experienced lawyers generally admonish young
lawyers to watch and listen to other lawyers' work and not to rely too
heavily on written law, as such reliance may make the lawyer appear to
be an "obstructionist."
c. Legal Strategies
Not being aware of the interface between the shared mental
model and the written law makes us blind to the room for legal strategies
not intended by legal decision-makers.8 4 Forum shopping and caseselection are widespread examples for the efficiency of these strategies.
They remind us that legal systems must be analyzed for the role of
strategy in them.85 Only then do we have the chance to go beyond what
the written law says and to find out what it does. It is this delivered law
that matters.86
d. China
China is further away from our views than we think. The
vagueness of language is partially corrected by the choice of many
ideograms. But the cultural characteristics prevail: modem written law
and practice may be worlds apart. The actual functioning of the system
often differs substantially from what one should expect from the

8' See id at 1526.
82 See id.
83

See id. at 1529.
84 See id. at 1522. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limit of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
85 See LoPucki, supra note 75, at 1547.
86
See id. at 1553.
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published sources. The dichotomy between paper and life (delivered
law) is immense. 7
The structure of Chinese writing is likewise important. This
writing still reflects its origin in pictographs, and the "discerning eye"
(Oliver Wendell Holmes) discovers many metaphorical allusions." The
Chinese refer, quite accurately, to their writing as "drawing"; Jack A.
Hiller makes this the center of his discussion and gives wonderful
examples. 89 He sees the alphabet as an expression of a mathematical
mind, resulting from analysis and synthesis, like a system of numbers,
and thus, a constant invitation to a mathematical mode of thinking
("half-brained lawyers.") 9° In contrast, the Chinese signs are more
symbols and pictures; they favor an intuitive, comprehensive approach.
According to Hiller (a friend and great teacher in these fields) the
consequences for the law are inevitable.
XII. Religion
1. Deus Geometra
Slowly, slowly we wordy rationalists realize that religious
pictures deep in the background of cultures act as subliminal guidelines
for feelings of order, as they express the fears and hopes (even into
eternity) that shape every detail.91 Certainly, we have a kind of feeling
for it when we talk about the Christian basis of Western Constitutions or
about the Confucian heritage in Asia. But we have to be far more
sensitive to it even in places where we expect it least: in our Western
rationality. 92
For example, the Continental European law (the "law of the
geometric mind" as the Japanese comparativist Yoshiyuki Noda called
it) is instilled with the medieval picture of the "dens geometra." He
created the world with a circle from chaos, and built a "cosmos," not a
"jungle." He cares for numbers (he has counted each hair on our heads)
and geometry (he ordered the world by measure, numbers, and weight).
87
88 See Benson, supranote 66, at 186.
See generallyBernhard Grossfeld, BILDHAFs R
8

-ECHTsDENKEN
(1996).

9 See Hiller, Half-BrainedLawyers, supranote 39, at 381.
90 Cf LOREN EisELy, THE STAR THROWER 267 (1979).
91 See Abraham Seidenberg, The Ritual Origin of Geometry, in ARCHrVE FOR THE
HISTORY OF Tim EXACT SCIENcES 488 (1960). See generally ALAN WATSON, JESuS AND
THm LAw (1996).
92 See generally Alfred Gierer, Fin Spiegel der Natur erkennen wir uns selbst, in
WIssENCHAFT UND MENSCHENBimD (1998) (for background in Newtonian physics).
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He even expresses himself in numbers (one God, three persons). Small
wonder then, that the "mos mathematicorum" of the Middle Ages and
the "mos geometricus" of the 17th and 18th centuries of enlightenment
stand behind our rules of accounting, and even behind Adam Smith's
"invisible hand., 93 Both concepts are derived from religious ideas about
94

order.

2. Numbers 95
Due to their religious background, Europeans (who love to
"construe" rules) tend to see the "rule of law" much like the "rule of
geometry" and like a "rule of numbers. 96 At first glance this looks
strange, but it probably has to do with the origins of counting and
speaking, and its transition into writing (particularly the alphabet).97
Numbers are a technology of distance in space and time; they derive
their power from their capacity to create and overcome distance.9 8 They

are a powerful mode of communication, easily reconstructed and
defended, justifying actions and legitimizing authority. They
standardize, produce uniformity, and have an enormous "constitutive
power. 9 9 "Sacred" numbers are prime instruments to transfer concepts
of order from one generation to the next (e.g. the seven days of the
week). 1'0 Numbers tend to erase the local and to paint an abstract view
of the world.

93See Samuel, supra note 6, at 829-33.
94 See Bernard Grossfeld,
Europaeisches Erbe als europaeische Zukunft, 54

JuRIsTENzRrrUNG 1 (1999); Grossfeld, supra note 27.
95See Bernhard Grossfeld, Numbers in Law, J. OF S. AM. L. 396 (1995). See generally
Debiprasad Chattopadhya, HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN ANCIENT INDIA
(1986) (for the cultural and technical background).
96 Wendy Nelson Espeland, Authority by the Numbers: Porter on Quantification,
Discretion, and the Legitimation ofExpertise, 22 L.& Soc. INQUIRY 1107, 1128 (1997);
cf.Steven Lubet, A Tour on the Calculus of Justice, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1035, 1035
(1998).
97 Cf Corballis, supra note 73; see, e.g., BERNHARD GROSSFELD, ZEICHEN UND ZAHLEN
im RECIrT (2d ed. 1997) (for Indo-European languages (nomadic background)). Numbers
are derived from fingers ("digits"); the German word "Zahl" means "number", the similar
Dutch word "taal" means "language." In the verb "to tell" both meanings come together,
as in the German words "zaehlen" and "erzaehlen". Other languages, e.g. Chinese, seem
to be more sound oriented and therefore less number oriented (rice growing culture). Cf.
BERNHARD
GROSSFELD, KERNFRAGEN DER RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG (1996).
98
See generally THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUrr OF OBJECIVrrY
IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995).

99See Espeland, supra note 96, at 1117.
100 See generally BERNHARD GROSSFELD, ZEICHEN UND ZAHLEN M REcI-rr (2d ed. 1997).
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They also establish a mechanical objectivity as an alternative to
individual trust or to personal knowledge. All relations get a touch of
objectivity -- coloring legal relations more like material objects than like
personal interactions. Thus, numbers "remake" the world, as they create
modes of thought, new categories' 0 1, and new entities to fill these
categories. Their impact on law is strong, as "numerically jaded
modems" have "become numb to their influence."' 0 2 However, let us be
cautious: numbers can be misleading - as statistics demonstrate.'0 3 Life is
too erratic to conform to the demands of science. That is why
"mechanical
objectivity" is always more ambiguous than it appears to
4

be. 1

3. Abstract Views
Certainly, there is more in numbers than religion and mechanical
objectivity, and there is more in abstract rule than just mathematics. The
cognitive limits of the human mind also leads to abstract rule: they
operate as a tool to simplify complexity. 0 5 Supported by a mathematical
approach and the alphabet, this impetus creates the illusion of equality in
law in the treatment of what language sees as "like" in a "like" manner.
But due to differences in space and time, every case is different) °0
Nevertheless, we attempt to treat cases alike because of the mental
efficiency thereby achieved: "If one can safely gloss over 'minor'
differences such as whether the plaintiff is a widow or a great
corporation, one need maintain only a simple mental category rather than
a thousand."'1' 7

4. China
This mathematical/geometrical alphabet-supported abstract view
is particular to Europe, at least to a large degree. It does not fit into the
Chinese "empire of (different) signs, "which numbers more than 50,000.
In China, we do not meet a single God or a rational creature of the world
nor an alphabet free of pictures. Hence, we do not run into abstract rules
originating from an abstract source (e.g. the number one). In the absence
101See Espeland, supra note 96, at 1115.

'02Id.
at 1130.
103 John Leubsdorf, Stories and Numbers, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 455, 455-58 (1991).
104 See Espeland,supra note 96, at 1120.
105 LoPucki, supra note 75, at 1498.
'6

See id. at 1542.

I71d.

24

RICHMONDJOURNAL OF GLOBAL LA WAND BUSINESS

[Vol.1:1

of a compelling need for the notion of general laws, thoughts in the mind
of God so to speak, little or no search was made for them.
XIII. Narratives
This brings us to narratives, a story told with pictures. As
alphanumeric addicts that have lost contacts with pictures, we
accommodate a reduction of complexity within our own environment,
and that is why we do not accept the complexity of the world for others.
The alphabet becomes our moral guidance, describing how the world
should be seen; however, we are outsiders of the foreign culture, and like
other outsiders, we can only bridge the gap by narratives by
unembellished storytelling. l og Only then may we avoid squeezing their
narrative into our rigid alphabet, i.e., squeezing specific categories into
our "appropriate" topics (e.g., the "Hegelian view") and methodologies,
and thereby determining names and overpowering the foreign narrative.
Absent such unembellished storytelling, we will never succeed because
"such representational practices are the proverbial peg in a round
hole." 10 9
XIV. Limits
There are limits to our understanding that hurt. We are nailed to
a concept of law that ultimately comes from heaven (e.g., the term
"father heaven"). 1 We rarely know how other cultures converse about
order, what they feel about it, and what pictures they see. Is equality, or
hierarchy, the order of life? Is mathematical and geometrical precision
desirable, or artificial? Do numbers represent a natural order, or do they
have an inhuman touch that does not fit into personal relations? We
know very little of the procedures followed in and out of foreign courts,
how these courts find facts,' and how judgments are enforced.' 12 This
108 Chon, supra note 50, at 4.
109 Id. at 23.
110 Cf MAss. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX ("A government of laws and not of men").
. See Mirjan Damaska, Rational and IrrationalProofRevisited, 5 Cardozo J.Int'l &
Comp. L. 25, 25-29 (1997).
112 See generally Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDozo J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1997) (analyzing the American and German legal systems); John H.
Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in ComparativeLaw, 5 CARDOZO J.INT'L L. 41 (1997)
(examining Oscar Chase's Legal Processes and National Culture); John H. Langbein,
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CmI. L. REV. 823 (1985) (comparing
some aspects of German court system with those of the American system); John C. Reitz,
Why we probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure,75 IOWA L.
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refers to both the United States and Japan, as well as at home, in Europe.
We do not know much about the procedures of our European neighbors.
In addition, no culture readily informs us about who bears the
costs of legal efficiency and rationality. This is often not discussed
within the culture. The law instead gives us a reassuring picture and
celebrates itself as an instrument of happiness; but there is no law
without sacrifices for somebody, and this darker side of law is normally
a taboo subject,' 13 particularly to foreigners.
Even if we employ all of our patience and humility, face-to-face
encounters remain a "diasporic experience."' 14 But this is also a chance.
Local experiences and globally felt categories can meet and test against
each other. We narrow the gap between our experiences, and we share
the sense that we have slightly different experiences; but both
experiences may lead to a shared recognition. There will always remain
a "foreign" component that we should not try to explain. To the contrary,
the hybrid of multi-cultural experiences can
transform cultural
5
differences into vital sources of creative energy.'
XV. Universals
This discussion now leads us to a question of legal universals.
Do human beings share the same or similar ideas about order? Do all
cultures have certain features of order in common? Is there an invisible
hand that creates patterns of orders without being noticed? 1 6 But what
is order? Is it a feeling "in the soul" as Blaise Pascal explained it? The
question indicates that the answer is not easy. Our impetus for
commonalties may not mislead us "to proclaim sameness" and to blind
our eyes to human differences." 7 Only on a basic level we might be
optimistic: we all have similar bodies, similar fears, and similar hopes in
common, and thus an inner eye that makes us see the world. However,
we live in different geographical environments, we are exposed to

REv. 987 (1990) (examining John Langbein's The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure).
"3 See Bernhard Grossfeld, The Invisible Hand: Patternsof Order in ComparativeLaw,
J. S. AiR. L. 648, 649 (1997). See generally BERNHARD GROSSFELD, RBCHrr ALS
LEiDENSORDtrNG
(1998).
11
4See REY CHOW, WmrIGN DIAsPoRA (1993).

" See Chon, supranote 50, at 9.
116See Bernhard Grossfeld, The Invisible Hand: Patternsof Order in Comparative
Law,
J. S. ArR. L. 648, 650-51 (1997).
117 See generally Curran, supranote 12.
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different semiotic impressions, which we have internalized in our early
childhood and cannot escape."1 8
XVI. Doubts
1. "Innocent" Words
We have entered Comparative Law with much optimism.
Comparative Law is important, very important, for all types of practical
purposes, no doubt about it. Nevertheless, doubts creep into our minds,
just like a cold fog creeping into the evening. This fog blurs our views
and causes us to become uneasy about where to go. Our job is probably
more difficult than we ever expected. The term "Comparative Law"
itself is indicative of this difficulty. The problem begins with the
"innocent" word of law, 119 and is only exasperated with the word
"comparative."
2. "Legal Transplants"

120

It goes without saying that we cannot argue any more in
"unqualified" terms of "legal transplants.' 21 It is quite probable this
term is derived from a concept of "law as geometry" 122 as Legrand
asserts. This is contrary to the literal meaning of the term. "Legal
transplants" may devote undue attention to the written law without
considering sufficiently that the letters get their meanings from
interpretative communities; letters and formulated rules lie on the
surface of culture, "whose true dimensions are found elsewhere."' 23
Certainly, ideas may be exported and imported, (whereas a valuable
exchange of new ideas are rare) but the "invested meaning cannot be
transferred from one culture to another. Additionally, the transferred
letters move into a different frame of intangibles and are immediately
invested with a new and normative content by the importing community.
The German Insolvency law is a fine example of this phenomenon. Only
See Grossfeld, supranote 116.

118

119 See Mark van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal Culture, Legal Paradigms, and

Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for ComparativeLaw, 47 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
495, 520 (1998).
120 See John D. Jackson, Playing the Cultural Card in Resisting Cross Jurisdictional
Transplants, 5 CARwOZO J. OF INTL & COMP. L. 51, 63-66 (1997).
121 See Pierre LaGrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAAsTRiCrrs J. OF
EUR.
& COMp. L. 111, 111 (1997).
122 1d. at 116.
12 3

1Id. at 119.
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the "honest debtor" will be discharged from debt, but it is a formidable
hurdle. In the United States; however, it is the opposite. Both the
24
"honest" and "dishonest" debtor will likely be discharged from debt.
This phenomenon should be of little concern to us, since we cannot
create transplants. All we can do is sow the seeds and then watch the
plant grow, never knowing which direction it will grow nor how it will
like the new soil and climate.
3. Comparison
The text-orientated approach towards law can no longer be
upheld. The attacks by Legrand 125 and Curran 126 are devastating; How do
we find the "tertium comparationis," the function of a foreign legal
institution, if we cannot find such functions in our own law? Quite often
we have to admit the law is just there, whether it can be explained or not.
Law grows more than it is planted, and its roots are often hidden under
an impenetrable cushion of traditions, rituals, and interests. What social
norms abroad correspond to our "law" and under what conditions?
What institution abroad is a "court"? What does "to compare," mean?
The hermeneutics already begin at home.
Other people may not even share the basic assumption with us,
to look at law as functional. It may even be forbidden to ask for the
function of the law (as in many religious laws). Searching for a function
might belittle the new law or might be perceived as an invitation to bend
the laws interests to those who question it. Even Houdini cannot escape
from this dilemma. We are always susceptible to determining the
function of the law from our point of view, thereby overlooking the other
view under the guise of "science"; we unconsciously import our legal
concepts into a foreign mind. Making function the "tertium
comparationis" is nothing more than an extension of the mathematical
and geometrical approach into a foreign environment.
4. Beyond Geometry
There is no strictly construable geometry in human life; there is
no starting point outside our own illusion. Comparative law is not like
comparing triangles to squares or multiangles. Law expresses a
commonality of experiences and feelings, and gives "music" and
124 See LoPucki supra note 70, at 1498.
12
See Pierre LeGrand, How to CompareNow, 16 L. STUDIES 232 (1996).
26
1

See Curran, supra note 56; Curran, supra note 12.
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"rhythm" to life. 12s Therefore, comparative law deals with infinite
aspects of human concepts, human experience, and human rhythms. It is
an external and internal dialog with another culture about concepts of
order and about experiences in different environments. A dialog with
human beings which share with us similar bodies and minds, hopes and
fears, although we can never fully imitate their inner eyes.128 There
always remains a "shadow" or "parallax."
5. Is there a Method?
Given the vastness and non-transparency of Comparative Law it
is very difficult, if not impossible, to find a consistent method.
Consistency cannot be found in a field that is largely unexplored; where
we only know the outlines. There will always remain much trial and
error, and a consistent concept will evolve along the way, and it may not
be the front-runner. It is here again that geometrical views meet their
limits. We have to test our chances knowing that we can learn by using
all of our senses when confronting the unexpected. The inherent limits
of this trial and error staggering along cannot be named malaise, because
they form part of the human condition with its miraculous secrets.
29
XVII. Comprehensive Approach1

We must look beyond texts and functions. We have to start with
130
the geographical background, as all concepts of order are local at first.
We may move onto the density of the population (telling us about
chances for transparency) over distance, or look at neighborhood
orientated relations. We have to ask what concepts of time are (linear or
circular) and analyze the farthest advancement in technical achievements
in any society. We also must look at interests and compound interests,
and we should never forget to ask who suffers the most from the law and
how they feel about it. To understand law and order in any society,
12 7 See Hanne Petersen, On Law and Music: From Song Duels to Rhythmic Legal Order,

J. Of L.

& UNOFFICIAL L. 75, 78 (1998). See also WILUAM H. MCNEIL,
DRILL IN HUMAN HISTORY (1995).
128 See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Herder and the Holocaust:A Debate About Difference
andDeterminism in the Context of ComparativeLaw, in THE HOLOCAUST: ART, POLTICS
EDUCATION (Frederick De Coste ed., forthcoming 1999).
129 See Grossfeld, supra note 116.
130 See Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and the Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1510, 1511
PLURALISM

KEEPING TOGETHER IN TIME, DANCE AND

(1984). See also Roy H. Andes, A Triumph of Myth over Principle: The Saga of the
Montana Range, 56 MONT. L. REv. 485, 486-87 (1995); John G. Spraniding The
AntiWilderness Bias in American PropertyLaw, 63 U. CHIC. L. REv. 519 (1996).
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anywhere, one must first understand the society's culture, including its
history and traditions."' Only then will we get a feeling for the
connection between law and societal "rhythms. ' 132 Law is an expression
of culture, but it also shapes retroactively the context from which it

originates and operates.' 3 3
XVIlI. Chances

134

It is this cultural awareness, this cultural sensitivity that opens
new chances for comparative law. Seeing the hurdles is the first way to
decrease and eventually overcome them. By placing our work into a
wider frame, it supports our claim for plausibility and reliability. Then,
Comparative Law can achieve this result - the ability to learn from each
other. A personal example is in my primary field of legal expertise,
corporate law. Through Comparative Law Germany learned a lot about
American Corporate Law, financial instruments, and vice versa.
Germany heard about the "Delaware Syndrome" in the competition for
corporate charters,135 and tried to prevent the same in the European
Union. 136 We learned about the worldwide spread of rules on insider
trading, 37 International Accounting Standards, 3 8 and principles of

evaluation of corporate shares. 39 Codes of conduct for transnational
corporations would never have seen the light of day without
Comparative Law, 4° nor would the Daimler-Chrysler merger. The

See Grossfeld, supra note 130, at 1518. See also David L. Cohen, Comment, Article
69
and EuropeanPatentIntegration, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1082, 1087-88 (1998).
132 See Peterson, supra note 127.
33
1 See Samuel, supra note 6, at 818-25.
13

134 See generally Nora V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunities and Risk: An Era of
Change
in ComparativeLaw, 6 AMER. J. COM. L. 647 (1998).
135 See ROBERTO ROMANO, FOUNDAnTONS OF CORPORATE LAw 87 (1993).
136 See generally Werner Ebke, Company Law and the European Union: Centralized

versus
DecentralizedLawmaking, 31 INT'L LAWYER 961 (1997).
137 See generally Thomas J. Andre, CulturalHegemony: The Exportationof Anglo-Saxon
Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69 (1998); Peter M.
Menuninger, The German Insider Law: Introduction and Discussion in Relation to
United States SecuritiesLaw, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 189 (1996).
' See Susan Binns, The EU Commission's Strategy with Respect to Accounting and
Disclosure,in BERICHT UEBER DIE FACHTAGUNG DES INSTrUTS DER WIRTSCHAFrPRUEFER
N DEurscmHAND 35 (Institute of Wirtschaftpruefer ed. 1998)( Wirtschaftpruefer is
roughly
equivalent to a Certified Public Accountant).
139 See Grossfeld, supranote 27.
'4o
See Ryan P. Toftoy, Note, Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global
Theatre. Is Nike Just Doing It. 15 ARiz. J. INT'L. L. AND COw. L. 905, 907 (1998).
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growing1 globalization of institutions and relationships work in our
4
favor!
Within this broader culture orientated, anthropological
approach,14 2 even the functional method adds something if applied 1to
43
carefully chosen technical questions in well defined environments,
although there will always remain loose ends.'" The functional method
is often suited for market activities and market regulations. Markets,
especially global markets, are strong environmental factors, exposed to
similar necessities of life, and create a similar business and investment
convention. Comparative Law tells us, for example, whether shares in a
foreign corporation have sufficient legal content for investment. The
answer is "probably"; we believe in the "wisdom" of the market more
than Comparative Law, but even so, law is one factor on which markets
conventions are based, even subliminally.
XIX. Conclusion
Does Comparative Law help? The answer is "Yes!' ', 45 Probably
not as much as some of us has hoped, and we are still searching for a
functional comparison everywhere, for a transfer of legal rules from one
culture to another. It is hard to learn from foreign experiences, as every
child knows so well. The Comparative Lawyer is often exposed to a
foreign language that does not flow from his heart and when he
expresses himself in a foreign language he loses some control. Chon tells
us about how her Korean mother tried to tech her daughter "American."
Only know do I realize the control she gave up by speaking my first
language instead of me speaking hers. For one thing, she will never
146
experience the act of belittling me, because I cannot say things "right."'
We all cannot say it right.
Comparative law leads us into temptations we never dared to
contemplate; imagination, intuitive perception, discipline, and our
141 See L. Amade Obiora, Toward an Auspicious Reconciliation of International and

ComparativeAnalyses, 46 AMER. J. CoMp. L. 669, 681 (1998).
142 See Laura Nader, Comments, Symposium: New Directions in Comparative Law 46
AMER.
J. OF COMP.
43

L. 751, 751-53 (1998).

1 For a balanced approach, see John C. Reitz, How to do ComparativeLaw, 46 Amer. J.

Comp. L. 751 (1998).
144 See RICHARD A. POsNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1996);
William Ewald, Posner'sEconomic Approach to ComparativeLaw, 33 TEx. INT'L. L. J.

381 (1998).
145 See James Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline, 46 AMER.
607 (1998).
146 Chon, supra note 50, at 27.
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courage will be tested. We lose our traditional shelters and sometimes
regret entering this vast and dangerous field. We will be inclined to give

up:
"Landscape in Motion
One must be able to leave
Yet be like a tree:
as if the roots stayed in the ground,
as if the landscape passed and we stayed firm."
(Hilde Domin)

47

But the rewards are worth the risks. The comparative lawyer
might gain the chance to present practical results, not just transplants,
but new ideas and wider exposure. Seeds he can sow. Above all;
however, he will learn about himself, about his own law, about his own
culture. He will see the World with new eyes, and he will get
accustomed to meet others with humility, empathy and courage. He will
accept distance and difference 148 and will hold back the "fast
comparisons." The foreign is and will remain what it is, foreign. The
ways in which these insights will bear fiuit are hardly foreseeable, but
fruit will be borne. It is an "opportunity not to be missed."' 49

147GuNTER EiCH ET AL., FouR GERMAN PoETs 73 (Agnes Stein ed. and trans., Red Dust

1979) (Poem by Hilde Domin).
See Guenther Frankenberg, CriticalComparisons: Rethinking ComparativeLaw, 26

148

HARVARD
INT'L L. J. 411,453 (1985).
149 Udo Mattei, An OpportunityNot to be Missed: The Future of ComparativeLaw in the
United States, 46 AMER. J. OF COMp. L. 709 (1998).

